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11.1 Introduction
The ﬁnancial crises in East Asia followed several years of large foreign ﬁ-
nancial capital inﬂows intermediated by the domestic banking system. The
crisis countries suﬀered tandem banking and currency crises that produced
sharp reductions in economic growth and subsequent ongoing domestic ﬁ-
nancial distress. In some cases, it was clear beforehand that the domestic
financial system was becoming increasingly fragile and crisis-prone—for
example, in Thailand. The currency crisis made matters worse due to the
uncovered foreign currency exposure of the banking system. A number of
authors have also argued that implicit government guarantees of foreign
currency liabilities of the domestic banks contributed to the ﬁnancial crisis
in Asia. More generally, Calvo (1998a) observes that emerging-market ﬁ-
nancial crises evolve through complicated interactions between domestic ﬁ-
nancial sectors, international lenders, and national monetary and ﬁscal au-
thorities. Our paper considers the dynamic consequences of interactions
between the microeconomics of private ﬁnancial intermediation and
public-sector ﬁnancial and macroeconomic policies in a currency crisis
model. We focus on the relationship between foreign capital inﬂows, eco-
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Most importantly, we relate the assumptions and implications of our model
to the East Asian currency crisis. We use the theoretical framework as a ba-
sis for comparing the experience of ﬁve East Asian economies in the 1990s.
This sample includes two economies that experienced currency crises, Ko-
rea and Thailand; one that almost experienced a crisis, Malaysia; and two
economies that did not experience crises, Taiwan and Singapore.
In an insightful paper, Carlos Diaz-Alejandro (1985) uses the Chilean ﬁ-
nancial crisis of 1981–83 to illustrate the dangers of ﬁnancial reforms under
ﬁxed exchange rates, free international capital ﬂows, and implicit guaran-
tees of bank deposits but weak domestic ﬁnancial supervisory systems. The
ﬁnancial crisis in Chile followed several years of steady liberalization and
privatization of domestic banking under explicit and repeated claims by the
authorities that deposits would not be insured by the government. When
tested in the late 1970s, the government intervened and rescued all deposi-
tors. When capital inﬂow restrictions were relaxed in 1981, capital inﬂows
surged under the anticipation of public bailouts as the domestic ﬁnancial
sector continued to deteriorate until their sudden reversal in the currency
crisis.
Diaz-Alejandro (1985) is impressively prescient of the East Asian crisis.
In this paper, we propose a theoretical model that formalizes his interpre-
tation by concentrating on the interactions between domestic ﬁnancial in-
stitutions, the regulation and subsidization of domestic ﬁnancial interme-
diation by the government, and foreign capital inﬂows leading up to a
ﬁnancial crisis. The model generates a path for domestic bank lending, cap-
ital accumulation, and the growth of the foreign currency debt of domestic
banks that ultimately leads to a ﬁnancial crisis with the collapse of the ﬁxed
exchange rate regime. The underlying disturbances in the model are simply
idiosyncratic productivity shocks across ﬁrms that occur when there are a
large number of ﬁrms; there are no exogenous aggregate shocks. However,
a problem of agency in domestic ﬁnancial intermediation leads banks to ac-
cumulate increasingly risky assets in equilibrium until the ﬁnancial system
is vulnerable to collapse with a reversal of foreign capital ﬂows. A key ele-
ment of our model is that the government provides implicit guarantees of
the foreign currency liabilities incurred by domestic banks following Diaz-
Alejandro (1985) and recent “third-generation” models of currency crises.
The theoretical model introduces an agency model of banking in the
spirit of Bernanke and Gertler (1989, 1990) and Bernanke, Gertler, and
Gilchrist (1999), in which domestic banks have an informational advantage
in lending to domestic ﬁrms, into a simple endogenous growth model. Ad-
verse selection in the choice of risky projects by ﬁrms leads to the coﬁnanc-
ing of investments by ﬁrm owners and banks. Individual ﬁrms become in-
solvent with positive probability in ﬁnite time, in which event banks have
incentives to renegotiate the ﬁrm’s debt in this model. With time, the pro-
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negotiated their loans in the past increases stochastically.
Foreign capital inﬂows allow lending and aggregate output to grow with-
out being constrained by domestic savings. The implicit insurance provided
to foreign creditors in the event that the government abandons the ﬁxed ex-
change rate sustains capital inﬂows to the banking system until the crisis oc-
curs. Over time, the domestic ﬁnancial sector becomes increasingly fragile
in this model. Prior to the crisis, capital inﬂows rise in proportion to do-
mestic production under constant returns to accumulable factors of pro-
duction. Investment may or may not rise as a ratio of output. The model
also predicts that the total equity value of the banking sector will be de-
creasing in absolute value and in proportion to the equity value of the bor-
rowing ﬁrms. The banking system becomes progressively more indebted
through foreign borrowing until it is ultimately insolvent. Capital inﬂows
cease in a sudden stop, investment reverses, and output drops sharply. The
postcrisis rate of growth will depend upon the new incentives for foreign
capital inﬂows after the crisis.
Other papers adopt the ﬁnancial accelerator model of Bernanke and
Gertler or its underlying agency model of ﬁnancial intermediation to ana-
lyze the link between foreign capital inﬂows and currency crises. Velasco
(1987) introduces banking into a version of the Krugman (1979) model of
speculative attacks on a ﬁxed exchange rate regime, and Aghion, Bacchetta,
and Banerjee (1999a, 2000) study the ampliﬁcation of aggregate shocks in
credit-constrained economies. Our analysis is quite diﬀerent in that we de-
tail the microeconomics of intermediation and focus on the path depend-
ence of ﬁnancial fragility in the open economy leading up to a crisis with
only ﬁrm-speciﬁc idiosyncratic shocks. The role of the implicit government
guarantees follows the observations made by Diaz-Alejandro (1985) and
Calvo (1998a) that a sovereign government has an incentive to subsidize
foreign capital inﬂows to overcome the problem of its own moral hazard in
setting trade, ﬁscal, and monetary policies. Mishkin (1996) and Obstfeld
(1998) among others have observed that government guarantees of foreign
currency deposits in the event of devaluation appear to be an implicit com-
panion to a pegged exchange rate regime. The currency crisis in our model
is generated by contingent public-sector insurance in the same way as in the
“third-generation” models proposed by Calvo (1998a, b) and Dooley
(2000). The emphasis on the fragility of the banking sector bears much in
common with the description and analysis of the East Asian crisis in
Corsetti, Pesenti, and Roubini (1998a). Other models that elaborate on the
role of public-sector guarantees of foreign currency debt and domestic
banking include Burnside, Eichenbaum, and Rebelo (1999) and Chinn and
Kletzer (2000).
A number of theoretical and empirical papers have been written on the
possible causes of the East Asian crisis and its consequences. These include
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Garber (1984), such as this one, and others based on liquidity crises, as ex-
empliﬁed by Chang and Velasco (1999).1 An alternative approach for mod-
eling domestic intermediation would be to adopt a model in which col-
lateral plays a central role in enforcing repayment. Caballero and
Krishnamurthy (1998) and Edison, Luangarum, and Miller (2000) both
adopt the Kiyotaki and Moore (1997) model of credit cycles to study ﬁnan-
cial crises in emerging markets. The Kiyotaki and Moore model precludes
the renegotiation of bank loans, although it can portray the collapse of the
value of ﬁxed assets and bank insolvencies during a systemic crisis. Chris-
tiano, Gust, and Roldos (2000) develop a diﬀerent version of the Kiyotaki
and Moore model in a ﬁnancial crisis model that endogenizes asset values
more richly. Although collateral does not enter contract enforcement in our
model of ﬁnancial intermediation, the model could be extended to endoge-
nize the value of physical assets.
Section 11.2 presents the theoretical model and its empirical implica-
tions. Sections 11.3 and 11.4 compare the assumptions of the model and its
predictions to the data for the ﬁve Asian economies in our sample with
broad success. We ﬁrst discuss how Korea, Thailand, Malaysia, Taiwan,
and Singapore diﬀer with respect to the institutional characteristics of
banking and corporate borrowing underlying our assumptions. We argue
that the necessary assumptions for the endogenous banking and currency
crisis to arise in the theoretical model ﬁt Korea and Thailand, the crisis
cases, very well and Malaysia reasonably well, but do not ﬁt the cases of Tai-
wan and Singapore. Section 11.5 shows how the paths for aggregate mea-
sures of economic and banking system performance diﬀer across the
economies in a manner predicted by the model.
11.2 A Theoretical Model of Financial Crises
We model international capital ﬂows and domestic ﬁnancial intermedia-
tion in an inﬁnitely lived small open economy with capital accumulation in
discrete time. Firms are established by entrepreneurs each of whom has
access to a set of projects that can be undertaken. Investment by firms is
financed by domestic household saving or by foreign financial capital
inﬂows. These ﬁnancial ﬂows are intermediated by banks. In our model,
banks operate a monitoring technology, and some of the potential entre-
preneurs have access to this technology.
The model’s economic environment is described ﬁrst and followed by an
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1. In addition to the papers already cited, related papers include Aghion, Bacchetta, and
Banerjee (1999b), Caballero and Krishnamurthy (1998), Corsetti, Pesenti, and Roubini
(1998a-c), Edison, Luangarum, and Miller (2000), Eichengreen and Rose (1998), Furman and
Stiglitz (1998), Goldfajn and Valdés (1997), Kumhof (1998), Krugman (1999), McKinnon and
Pill (1999), Radelet and Sachs (1998), and Sachs, Tornell, and Velasco (1996).analysis of the dynamics of bank lending. The role of foreign capital inﬂows
and the dynamics of a ﬁnancial crisis are then discussed.
11.2.1 Economic Environment
There is a single good that can be consumed, invested, or traded interna-
tionally. It can be produced using entrepreneurial labor and capital. The
model allows investment to be reversible, although we will consider the con-
sequences of a costly dismantling of a ﬁrm’s capital stock. For simplicity,
there is no depreciation. Production takes one period, and the gross output
produced in any period is stochastic.
All residents have identical preferences over inﬁnite-horizon consump-
tion plans and are endowed with a single unit of labor each period. Each
person is a potential entrepreneur, who can select and invest in a new proj-
ect every period. The investment opportunities available to diﬀerent people
do not need to be identical, so that entrepreneurs may be heterogeneous
with respect to skills or knowledge. However, the set of techniques of pro-
duction available to each entrepreneur does not change over time, and a
subset of entrepreneurs know how to operate banks.
Households are risk averse and seek to smooth consumption over time.
They receive entrepreneurial income and interest earnings from ﬁnancial
savings. The utility function for a household is given by




where u(c) is strictly concave and 0    1. This is maximized with respect
to a consumption plan subject to the intertemporal budget identity.
(2) as 1   as   (rs
dw s   r∗f s)    s   cs    (w s),





v t  
1  
1
rv ∗      0,
given initial ﬁnancial wealth, at   w t   f t. Here, w equals deposits held in
domestic banks, which earn a deposit rate of interest rd, and f equals hold-
ings of foreign deposits, which earn interest r∗. Domestic transactions are
denominated in units of domestic currency, and the nominal exchange rate
is ﬁxed. Money is held (in the form of interest-bearing deposits) to econo-
mize on transactions costs,  (w t), where   (w t)   0. If domestic residents
hold foreign assets in equilibrium, then the opportunity return to domestic
bank deposits, rd –   (w t), will be equal to the foreign currency rate of inter-
est, r∗, less any currency risk premium. If foreign residents hold domestic
deposits (as we will assume they do in equilibrium), then rdwill equal r∗cor-
rected for currency risk and all domestic financial saving will be held in
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 . The model has been written under the assumption that each entrepre-
neur owns the equity in his or her ﬁrm. Tradable equity complicates the
presentation without much gain, but we will be interested in the value of
ﬁrm equity later. The inclusion of a demand for money is later used to jus-
tify invoking a conventional monetary model of the nominal exchange rate.2
Demand deposits pay a positive rate of return so that money is held only as
deposits in equilibrium for the model economy.
Each ﬁrm is established by a particular entrepreneur. Production uses
capital and one unit of entrepreneurial labor to produce output each pe-
riod. Production displays constant returns to capital and increasing returns
to entrepreneurial eﬀort. The quantity of output produced by any given in-
put bundle is stochastic. Each entrepreneur has access to a particular col-
lection of possible projects to undertake. Projects diﬀer with respect to the
distribution of output produced across states of nature for any given capi-
tal input. For example, the distribution of output for one project might be
a mean-preserving spread of another. The set of projects available to each
nonbank entrepreneur can either be the same or diﬀerent. In either case, en-
trepreneurs can choose to undertake diﬀerent projects.
The production function for a ﬁrm j is given by
(4) y j




t is the capital stock of ﬁrm j predetermined by investment under-
taken in period t – 1. Output gross of the capital stock is yj
t, so that  j
t is the
stochastic (marginal and average) gross productivity of capital. For each
possible project,  j
t is nonnegative and distributed identically and indepen-
dently across time. A project is uniquely determined by its distribution over
the productivity of capital.
Firms can ﬁnance capital accumulation by borrowing from banks or by
investing their own saving. All entrepreneurs will seek to diversify their in-
come risk by allocating their wealth between bank deposits and equity in
their own ﬁrms. Their choices are limited to these two by imperfect infor-
mation. Bankers have an absolute advantage at monitoring ﬁrm choices of
projects and realized output each period. Households reduce their expo-
sure to risk by lending to banks, which in turn lend to many ﬁrms, thereby
diversifying individual ﬁrm project risk for their depositors. Firms can use
current proﬁts to ﬁnance investment (retained earnings) or pay dividends to
the owner-household. To make the connection to corporate borrowing
from this model of entrepreneurship, we add the restriction that the house-
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2. Our innovation concerns the dynamics of a banking crisis. We do not write out the model
of the shadow exchange rate because we simply use the model of Krugman (1979) and Flood
and Garber (1984).hold cannot be forced to draw against its other assets (bank deposits) to
supply additional capital to the ﬁrm it owns. That is, we separate the entre-
preneurial role of the owner from the saving and consumption role of the
household in Robinson Crusoe fashion.
The well-known model of banking as delegated monitoring (Diamond
1984; Freixas and Rochet 1997) works to rule out direct equity investment
by households in the projects of other entrepreneurs and implies that banks
use conventional debt contracts. The model assumes that output realiza-
tions by a ﬁrm in any period are costlessly observed only by the entrepre-
neur of that ﬁrm and that bankers have access to a technology that allows
them to observe project outcomes at a lower cost than households. To make
things simple, assume that households are unable to observe the actual out-
put of any ﬁrm other than their own at any cost; below we discuss weaken-
ing this assumption and allowing equity trade. We also assume that the
costs of monitoring a ﬁrm are indivisible, so that economies of scale are re-
alized when ﬁrms borrow from a single bank in equilibrium.3
Whereas costly observability can be used to rationalize bank lending via
standard debt contracts, the primary informational asymmetry here con-
cerns the choice of project by the ﬁrm. This choice involves adverse selec-
tion as in a variety of credit market models that follow Stiglitz and Weiss
(1981). The bank lends an amount  t to a typical ﬁrm in period t – 1 to ﬁ-
nance a capital stock equal to kt, which will produce output in period t. The
ﬁrm selects its project for period t in period t – 1 to maximize its value. The
ﬁrm’s capital stock evolves according to
(5) kt 1    kt   Rt t    t 1    t,
where Rt is the gross interest charged to the period t loan. Consider the
simple case a single round of lending with no ongoing capital accumulation
and production. In this case the return to the ﬁrm under limited liability is
given by
(6) ﬁrm’s return   max{ tkt   Rt t, 0},
whereas the return to the bank is given by
(7) bank’s return   min{Rt t,  tkt    }   (1   rt
d) t,
where   represents observation costs. The borrower will choose a riskier
project from among those with a common mean than is in the best interests
of the lender. Although informational imperfections restrict an entrepre-
neur’s capacity to diversify income risk, limited liability and the conven-
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3. In the literature on ﬁnancial intermediation as delegated monitoring, increasing returns
to scale in banking are a common assumption. See Freixas and Rochet (1997) and Holmstrom
and Tirole (1997). This assumption is essential to our conclusions about loan renegotiation be-
cause it precludes complex arguments involving game models.tional debt contract provide a degree of risk sharing between households
that is constrained by the disincentives for borrower risk avoidance.
Coﬁnancing given by the diﬀerence xt   kt –  t reduces the incentives for
the ﬁrm to choose a riskier project and raises the expected return to the
lender. This is immediately true for the repeated lending case in our capital
accumulation model. The bank chooses a combination of loan size,  t, rate
of interest, r t   Rt – 1, and coﬁnancing requirement,





 t  ,
to maximize its expected return. This is demonstrated by Bernanke and
Gertler (1989, 1990) in a moral hazard model. They explain the importance
of coﬁnancing as a solution to the agency problem in banking and for gen-
erating ﬁnancial fragility. Another way to motivate bank lending in our
model is to assume that banks have a cost advantage setting zt by monitor-
ing the investment level of the ﬁrm.
Limited liability plays a key role in this economy. Firms can go bankrupt,
which means here that current assets,  tkt, accrue to the bank, and the ﬁrm
ceases to exist. A ﬁrm would only choose bankruptcy if its value as an on-
going enterprise was nonpositive. When the ﬁrm cannot service its debts in
full, the bank faces a choice of declaring the ﬁrm bankrupt or renegotiating
the terms of its loan. Equivalently, a bank can go bankrupt if it cannot meet
its deposit liabilities as demanded by depositors. With reversible invest-
ment, all the assets of the client ﬁrms of a bank can be used to meet depos-
itors’ claims, so that a bank will only be unable to repay its deposit liabili-
ties on demand if the sum of the capital stocks of each of its client ﬁrms fails
to exceed the gross interest it has promised depositors. When investment is
nonreversible, at least in the short run, then the bank can be illiquid with-
out being insolvent. The production function could be rewritten to incor-
porate time to build to allow for the possibility of self-fulﬁlling bank runs,
as demonstrated by Diamond and Dybvig (1983) and used in the Chang
and Velasco (1999) model of ﬁnancial crises. This extension is not explored
in this paper. The renegotiation of bank loans, option value of the ﬁrm, and
the role of deposit insurance are discussed in the next subsection.
The economy will be open to international ﬁnancial capital inﬂows and
outﬂows. Net capital inﬂows are equal to the current account deﬁcit plus
any increase in central bank reserves through the balance-of-payments
identity. Private foreign borrowing is intermediated by domestic banks. The
current account surplus is given by
(8) bt 1   bt   rt ∗bt  [y t    (w t)]   ct   kt 1,
where bt is the current stock of foreign debt for the country denominated in
units of foreign currency, and other variables are expressed as economy-
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sume that nominal prices are perfectly ﬂexible and that purchasing power
parity and uncovered interest parity hold. All debt in the model is short-
term debt.
Fiscal policy plays a key role for generating a currency crisis under the
ﬁxed exchange rate regime. There are no public expenditures, but the gov-
ernment can provide deposit insurance for domestic residents and debt re-
payment guarantees to foreign lenders. These contingent liabilities could be
ﬁnanced through taxes (including premia charged to banks or depositors)
or through monetization. For simplicity, deposit guarantees will be ﬁ-
nanced by current or future monetization in the model.
11.2.2 Capital Accumulation and Bank Lending
In this section, we consider the dynamics of domestic bank lending and
economic growth in the closed economy. The capital account will be opened
later. The economy starts in a state in which all ﬁrms have the same capital
stock, and, for expositional simplicity, we allow all projects to be chosen
from a common set.
First, consider the case of a ﬁrm that realizes a high output in period t.
The net income for the ﬁrm is given by
(9) (  1)kt   rt t   0,
so that the entrepreneur can consume a dividend or increase his or her eq-
uity in the ﬁrm (r   R – 1). This ﬁrm’s bank made its loan oﬀer in period t
– 1,  t, optimally given the collection of projects available and the entrepre-
neur’s contribution to the ﬁrm’s investment. In general, the equilibrium
loan will lead to a positive value of z less than 1.4 The banker is then willing
to lend an additional amount,
(10)  t 1    t    
1
z
 [(  1)kt   rt t],
leading to an increase in the ﬁrm’s capital stock of




  [(  1)kt   rt t],
if the interest rate rt
d remains unchanged. This equation of motion incorpo-
rates the ﬁnancial accelerator that plays a central role in Bernanke and
Gertler (1989, 1990). Furthermore, this ﬁrm is able to repay its entire debt
at time t. Therefore, it could pay oﬀ its debt to its current bank and take a
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4. For an interior solution with respect to coﬁnancing and loan supply, the bank’s return (eq.
[7]) needs to be increasing in z given the ﬁrm’s optimal choice of project from maximization of
equation (6). The very simple version of Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) in Mankiw (1986) can be
used to demonstrate an interior solution.new loan (of size  t 1 above) from another bank. That is, it can roll over its
short-term debt on the market. Competition among banks ensures that the
interest rate charged on the loan,  t 1, is independent of the rest of the
bank’s particular portfolio.5
Instead, suppose that the ﬁrm realizes a low level of output. In this case,
we have
(12) (  1)kt   rt t   0
but either
(13)  kt   Rt t   0o r kt   Rt t   0.
In the ﬁrst instance, the ﬁrm contracts according to equation (11). In the
second, the ﬁrm is unable to meet its debt obligations even if it liquidates its
entire stock of capital. In this case, the ﬁrm can be declared bankrupt by its
creditor. However, the bank can possibly do better than to liquidate the ﬁrm
and use the proceeds to repay its depositors or pay its owner dividends. This
is because the bank now has market power vis-à-vis the ﬁrm in a debt
rollover or renegotiation under a simple seniority rule. Another bank could
possibly oﬀer a new loan to the ﬁrm, allowing it to pay oﬀ its debt and in-
vest for the next period. Under such a loan, investment is given by
(14) kt 1    t 1    kt   Rt t   0.
That is, the ﬁrm’s investment is less than the loan principal. The new bank
must charge an interest premium to recover the opportunity cost of the por-
tion of the loan used by the ﬁrm to pay oﬀits period tdebt. This kind of loan
may not even be oﬀered, because the entrepreneur now owns none of the
capital stock of the ﬁrm (z is zero), which situation, along with the higher
interest rate, encourages greater risk taking by the entrepreneur.
The current bank, however, may gain by oﬀering a new loan when other
lenders will not. This is the case if
(15) max
R, 
Et [min(R ,       )   (1   rd
t 1) ]   0,
given the optimal choice of project by the borrower conditional on Rand  .
The implied interest rate premium is constrained by the premium that a new
lender would charge. When such a premium does not exist, as a conse-
quence of the agency problem, the ﬁrm’s current banker faces no potential
competition in the rollover market. The excess returns on such a new loan
are applied against the opportunity cost of the unpaid period t debt, Rt t.
Therefore, the ﬁrm’s bank can choose to roll over the unpaid debt and oﬀer
new capital in exchange for a deeper claim, Rt 1( t kt 1), against the earn-
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5. This is stated in this way because bankers are risk averse in this model. With risk-neutral
banks, the expected proﬁt from this loan would be zero in equilibrium.ings of the ﬁrm,  kt 1, in favorable states of nature. The supernormal prof-
its on these rollovers encourage the renegotiation of short-term bank debt
and discourage the formal bankruptcy of insolvent ﬁrms when equations
(14) and (15) hold. For equation (15) to hold, we need to impose the condi-
tion that the optimal project choice of the entrepreneur when z   0 yields
at least positive expected total surplus; that is, Et  1  rt
d. The level of new
capital provided to the ﬁrm is chosen by the banker along with the interest
rate to maximize utility from the proﬁts realized on the banker’s entire port-
folio. These incentives will rise if liquidating a debtor is costly for banks.
We note that the equilibrium loan renegotiation can simply be written
as a rollover of the unpaid gross interest at the new rate of interest. Write-
downs are unnecessary, because any unpaid gross interest in the future can
continue to be rolled over in renegotiations. Through repeated loan roll-
overs, the bank may acquire a permanent monopoly franchise on lending
to the ﬁrm, but it will only enforce repayment terms in equilibrium that max-
imize the banker’s expected utility from her portfolio.6
The projects undertaken by insolvent ﬁrms in a rollover will be riskier
than those the same ﬁrm chose when its net worth was positive. Suppose
that the set of projects includes a continuum of mean-preserving spreads of
the project chosen by the ﬁrm at the initial equilibrium coﬁnancing re-
quirement, z. When the ﬁrm becomes insolvent (eq. [14] holds) and the loan
is renegotiated, the entrepreneur will choose a mean-preserving spread of
the original project because z is zero. The interest premium provides an ad-
ditional reason for the debtor to make a riskier choice of project. The prob-
ability that the bank’s borrowing cost of the new capital, (1   rd
t 1)kt 1, ex-
ceeds the gross project returns,  kt 1, is greater for the renegotiated loans of
insolvent ﬁrms than for loans to solvent ﬁrms.
Once a bank has rolled over the debt of one of its clients, it faces a higher
probability of loan rollovers for this ﬁrm in the future. The probability that
the ﬁrm will need to renegotiate its debts again,
Pr( kt   Rt t),
rises with  t – kt. Further, for the new capital provided to the ﬁrm, the prob-
ability that its cost to the bank will not be covered,
Pr[ kt   (1   rt
d)kt],
rises as the project choice becomes riskier. These rollovers are negotiated in
a forward-looking fashion, but their probability and terms are path de-
pendent. Renegotiating bank debt through rollovers and providing new
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6. In the adverse selection model, increasing the rate of interest induces riskier project choice
by the entrepreneur and eventually lowers the lender’s expected return (Stiglitz and Weiss
1981). This implies that the bank may not claim all of the entrepreneur’s potential future prof-
its in every event in the equilibrium following renegotiation, no matter how large the ﬁrm’s debt
on the bank’s books grows. This depends on the set of projects available to the ﬁrm.capital is superior for the bank to cutting its losses. While the bank is rolling
over loans, it must also be rolling over deposit liabilities. A ﬁrm’s debt will
continue to be rolled over in equilibrium as low output states of nature are
realized until the claim of the bank exhausts all the possible payments that
it can extract from the ﬁrm in every future event. This occurs with positive
probability and means that the opportunity cost (deposit liability incurred)
of the ultimate loan exceeds its expected return.
Banks face competition from each other for loans to ﬁrms that have been
able to repay their debts in full in the previous period (for example, growing
ﬁrms). The interest premium charged on loans to these customers covers the
expected present value loss if revenues fall short of the opportunity cost of
the funds lent. This present value is calculated taking into account the equi-
librium renegotiation of loans that fall into default. However, a bank can-
not successfully charge a premium on loans to cover the losses on other,
renegotiated, loans in its portfolio. As loans are renegotiated (an event that
occurs with positive probability), the portfolio of the bank changes. In this
model, banks will not hold perfectly diversiﬁed loan portfolios even if they
can because their aversion to risk and their liability are both limited.
Consider an individual bank with a constant level of deposits. Eventu-
ally, in this model, one of its client ﬁrms will be unable to repay and will
renegotiate its loans with the bank because productivity shocks are inde-
pendently and identically distributed (i.i.d.) for any given project. The bank
will begin shifting its loan portfolio toward this ﬁrm, and the probability of
a subsequent rollover rises with each renegotiation as the positive probabil-
ity that  kt   Rt t rises as  t – kt rises with each realization of productivity
less than Rt t/kt. The probability of a reallocation away from other ﬁrms to-
ward those clients that have suﬀered low output realizations is path de-
pendent and increases with each poor outcome, when the loan terms
oﬀered by other banks are taken as given. The bank’s portfolio becomes
riskier over time. The probability that the bank will be unable to meet a
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rises stochastically. That is, its expectation must be nondecreasing. The sum
in equation (16) is taken with respect to the client ﬁrms of the individual
bank.
With capital accumulation, banks can grow because household savings is
positive. In this endogenous growth model, we let the average net produc-
tivity of capital exceed the discount rate of households, or, alternatively, the
world real rate of interest for the open economy. Starting out with positive
initial ﬁrm assets (uniform across all ﬁrms) and a large number of ﬁrms, the
growth rate of the capital stock rises with E  – (1   rd). For example, if we
518 Robert Dekle and Kenneth Kletzerignore the residual risk faced by households and let utility be logarithmic,
we conclude that the capital stock grows in expectation as
E  (1    ),
where  is the pure subjective discount rate of households and E is average
gross return to capital across the economy. Eventually, however, some ﬁrms
do become insolvent, as implied by equation (11). As they do so, banks
renegotiate these loans and lend more capital to these ﬁrms. In a closed
economy equilibrium, saving constrains the growth of the aggregate capital
stock, so that loan rollovers necessarily reduce the growth rates of other
ﬁrms. This implies that the coﬁnancing share for solvent ﬁrms rises as other
ﬁrms are unable to repay their current debts. This provides a partially oﬀset-
ting eﬀect in the closed economy—solvent ﬁrms will expand more slowly
but make less risky project selections.
In this economy, the probability that a bank becomes insolvent rises over
time as renegotiation of individual client loans takes place. Path depend-
ence of the riskiness of bank portfolios and the probability of eventual bank
insolvencies arise from the renegotiation of loans in the presence of the
agency problem. This shift in the riskiness of the aggregate portfolio of the
banking system would not occur if banks simply closed ﬁrms that were in-
solvent. The riskiness of each bank’s portfolio in that case would remain the
same over time. Forcing banks to write-down debts by marking loans to
market under capitalization requirements may be a way of reducing this
type of increasing vulnerability to idiosyncratic shocks.
In the standard banking model adopted here, depositors face a moral
hazard problem when lending to banks. Each saver cannot monitor the
bank’s portfolio choices. The solution for this problem is the conventional
deposit contract, which allows a depositor to reclaim the gross deposit with
interest at any time and prevents the bank from renegotiating with individ-
ual depositors. It is possible to model bank runs in this economy as the
probability that some banks cannot service their deposit claims rises over
time, but depositors do not know which banks these will be. Such a run is
not self-fulﬁlling, as demonstrated by Diamond and Dybvig (1983), and we
do not add the assumptions needed to generate such possibilities. The in-
troduction of deposit insurance could be justiﬁed in this manner or by its
eﬀect of lowering the deposit rate of interest in this economy. Without per-
fect information about the loan portfolio of each bank at all times, deposit
insurance can exacerbate the tendency of banks to choose riskier portfolios
and raise the transition probabilities of bank insolvencies. Deposit insur-
ance should be associated with greater fragility of the ﬁnancial sector in the
absence of enforced regulations that restrict loan renegotiation.
The problem of loan renegotiation may realistically extend to the case of
a ﬁrm that cannot meet its net interest obligation. This is the event in which
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If capital is not costlessly reversible, then the ﬁrm is illiquid but not insol-
vent. In this case, loan rollovers can also be optimal. Under this type of
rollover, the ﬁrm’s capital stock in period t 1 is higher than otherwise, and
its choice of project is riskier. The probability of bank collapses rises with
costly disinvestment.
Another possible extension of the model is to introduce diﬀerential costs
of monitoring ﬁrm behavior between savers and banks. In the model by
Holmstrom and Tirole (1997), ﬁrms begin to borrow directly as their capi-
tal increases. Such access to direct borrowing could be introduced into this
framework (and associated with the equity of entrepreneurs in their ﬁrms)
to provide another reason for competitive pressure to keep down interest
rates for successful borrowers as bank portfolios become heavier in rolled-
over ﬁrm debt.
11.2.3 Foreign Capital Inﬂows to Domestic Banks
We now consider this banking sector in the open economy. Again, do-
mestic banks have a cost advantage over foreign lenders in observing the
output realizations of domestic entrepreneurs. This advantage can be as-
sumed to be large enough to preclude any direct foreign portfolio lending
to domestic entrepreneurs. Alternatively, following Holmstrom and Tirole
(1997), foreign creditors might have a cost disadvantage in monitoring ﬁrm
behavior that leads to direct lending only after a threshold in ﬁrm equity is
passed. In that case, the increase in monitoring costs is oﬀset by the incen-
tive eﬀect of a larger share of the ﬁrm’s capital that is owned by the entre-
preneur.
When deposit insurance guarantees discriminate between foreign and
domestic depositors, foreigners accumulate risky deposit claims against do-
mestic banks. In the event that a bank is unable to meet its entire deposit li-
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are divided between foreign depositors and the deposit insurer. The inﬂow
of foreign capital to the banking sector will be sensitive to the anticipated
ex post seniority rights of foreign creditors vis-à-vis the insurer (typically,
the government).
The government can encourage capital inﬂows in the presence of moral
hazard and adverse selection in domestic banking and investment by guar-
anteeing the real value of the gross exposure of foreign lenders. In the short
run, the government can do this by ﬁxing the exchange rate, which removes
the incentives for banks to hedge foreign currency risk (as demonstrated by
Burnside, Eichenbaum, and Rebelo 1999). If banks borrow in foreign cur-
520 Robert Dekle and Kenneth Kletzerrency–denominated loans under a ﬂoating rate, they face the risk of insol-
vency (balance sheet risk) in the event of a depreciation that raises the de-
posit insurance obligation of the government ceteris paribus. We are inter-
ested in the consequences of a ﬁxed exchange rate regime with an explicit or
implicit government guarantee of the foreign liabilities of the banking sec-
tor in the event of a switch to a ﬂoat, and not the welfare economics of this
policy. Therefore, we make the assumption that the government implicitly
guarantees foreign liabilities denominated in foreign currency in the event
that it abandons the exchange rate peg. In this event, there can be a broad
ﬁnancial crisis, because banks do not hedge foreign currency risk (in antic-
ipation of this type of bailout) and devaluation reduces foreign currency
values on the asset side of the balance sheets for all banks. We impose an
upper bound to the amount that the government will guarantee, given by d  .
Up to this limit, foreign loans to the domestic banking sector are riskless.
That is, there is no currency risk until d  is reached. For simplicity, we assume
that d  is known with certainty. A limit on the indemnity liability of the gov-
ernment comes from the requirement that the government satisfy its in-
tertemporal budget constraint. Foreign lenders are not protected by the de-
posit insurance scheme oﬀered to domestic savers.
Foreign capital inﬂows can raise the aggregate growth rate of the model
economy. Banks will borrow at the constant world rate of interest to lend ei-
ther to ﬁrms that have not yet renegotiated their debts or to ﬁrms that have.
As rollovers accumulate, foreign inﬂows allow banks to expand their lend-
ing to ﬁrms that are liquid according to the solution to the agency problem,




 [(  1)kt   r t t],
where ( – 1)kt– r t t 0. Similarly, they are able to continue lending to ﬁrms
that are either illiquid (in the case of irreversible investment) or insolvent (in
the case of either irreversible or reversible investment) with rollovers. In the
open economy, foreign capital inﬂows allow banks to continue lending to
solvent ﬁrms at the ex ante optimal choice of coﬁnancing, z, while provid-
ing capital to insolvent ﬁrms under renegotiated loans. In contrast with the
closed-economy case, the growth of solvent ﬁrms is not reduced by renego-
tiation, so that the ﬁnancial accelerator is larger for the open economy.
However, z also does not rise for these ﬁrms as banks lend more capital to
renegotiating ﬁrms. The oﬀsetting reduction in the riskiness of project
choices for solvent ﬁrms experienced in the closed economy disappears, and
the riskiness of bank portfolios rises with the opening of the capital ac-
count.
Consider the instance of an economy with reversible investment and no
ﬁrms that have renegotiated debts. The capital stock and gross output grow
according to the AK model at the diﬀerence between equilibrium net pro-
ductivity, E(  – 1), and the foreign rate of interest (lower than the appro-
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tive). However, once there is a rollover, the capital stock will grow faster for
the small open economy that faces a perfectly elastic supply of deposits at
the foreign rate of interest. This is because bank loan renegotiation prevents
ﬁrms from contracting on one end of the spectrum while ﬁrms continue to
grow (stochastically) under constant returns to capital at the other end.
Foreign lenders, however, face diﬀerent incentives under the implicit
guarantee associated only with a broad crisis in the event of a collapsing ex-
change rate regime. They lose if a single bank is forced into bankruptcy
idiosyncratically while domestic deposits are insured. However, as the port-
folios of individual banks become ever riskier with infusions of foreign de-
posits, more and more banks reach potential crisis. This follows from the re-
sult that renegotiation leads to increasingly risky bank portfolios and rising
contingent liabilities for the banks’ creditor (the deposit insurer). Banks en-
ter insolvency with positive probability. The probability of leaving insol-
vency decreases as more of the bank’s ﬁrms renegotiate loans with positive
probability and choose ever riskier projects in the absence of coﬁnancing.
Foreign inﬂows that sustain these banks allow more and more banks to be-
come insolvent. The contingent liability of government, dt, is a random
variable that also follows a submartingale. It must reach its upper bound in
ﬁnite time.
This process is driven by the ultimate prospect of a bailout of foreign
lenders. Such a bailout could happen immediately if foreign lenders realized
a larger rate of return from the government bailout than the world rate of
interest. We think that it is unrealistic to assume they do. Therefore, a
bailout happens progressively and with stochastic timing because there are
positive real net returns to domestic investment.
In the equilibrium path for the economy with foreign capital inﬂows, this
process implies that we should observe increasing ﬁnancial capital inﬂows
as the crisis draws nearer. Each rollover raises the ratio of bank deposit lia-
bilities to physical capital,  /k, in this model. As rollovers become more
probable, this ratio rises faster. In the model, output is proportional to cap-
ital, y    k, so that the debt to gross domestic product ratio is rising, as is
its foreign component. We also note that the capital stock will be growing
at a faster rate with an open capital account and implicit guarantees of for-
eign currency bank debts, in contrast to the case for the closed economy.
However, gross domestic product may not be rising with the capital stock as
more and more ﬁrms no longer coﬁnance investment and choose riskier
projects.
11.2.4 Foreign Capital Inﬂows and Twin Crises
The link to currency crises comes about by the same mechanism pro-
posed by Dooley (2000), Burnside, Eichenbaum, and Rebelo (1999), Chinn
and Kletzer (2000), and others. These “third-generation” models of ﬁnan-
522 Robert Dekle and Kenneth Kletzercial crises are based on ﬁrst-generation models of a speculative attack but
add the twist that domestic credit creation follows the attack and is contin-
gent on the collapse. It is assumed that the cost of the bailout is ultimately
monetized and that the implied ex post growth rate of domestic credit is in-
consistent with the exchange rate peg.
The mechanics of a crisis need to be described a bit more. There is an up-
per bound on the credit that will be extended by foreign lenders to the do-
mestic banks when the ultimate bailout is bounded from above by d  . This is
the sum of the government’s implicit guarantee, central bank reserves, and
the residual capital of the banking system in the event of a ﬁnancial crisis.
This upper bound is reached in ﬁnite time with probability 1 as a conse-
quence of the bank debt rollover dynamics for the agency model as ex-
plained above. Eventually, the foreign debt of the banking sector exceeds
the value of the banking sector plus central bank reserves minus domestic
deposits.7 This excess claim at time T is dT.
Suppose a run occurs in period T, so that the debt of the government rises
by the amount dT, which will be paid through domestic credit creation. The
expected rate of depreciation after the abandonment of the ﬁxed exchange
rate is increasing in dT. A rise in the rate of depreciation lowers domestic
money demand at the instant of the speculative attack. This reduction is
also increasing in dT. Therefore, a portion of central bank reserves is taken
by parties other than holders of foreign bank deposits in the currency crisis.
This amount is given by Rd
T    (dT), where   (dT)   0. The reserves taken
by foreign holders of short-term foreign currency bank debt, Rf
Texhaust the
remaining reserves used in defense of the peg, R  T. These equal the diﬀer-
ence between total foreign claims against the domestic banking sector, de-
noted bT, and the government’s guarantee, so that Rf
T   bT – dT.
At the time of the twin banking and currency crises, we have the equilib-
rium condition,
(19) R  T   Rd
T   Rf
T   bT   dT    (dT),
where dtis a stochastic function of bt. That is, both depend on the history of
lending, investment, and production in the domestic economy leading up to
the crisis. The timing of the crisis is stochastic and path dependent.
Whether a crisis can occur in this economy depends upon the size of the
maximal government guarantee, d  , relative to reserves. This is because an
increase in government debt equal to d  leads to a particular rate of domes-
tic credit creation if it is entirely monetized. This rate of domestic credit cre-
ation may or may not lead to a ﬁrst-generation currency crisis at the mo-
ment it is incurred. It can be too small, implying a collapse of the ﬁxed
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7. We do not preclude banks’ lending to each other. Since they can do so, what matters is the
aggregate solvency of the banking sector and not the solvency of individual banks.exchange rate regime at some later date. If this is the case, foreign creditors
will not be bailed out until the collapse and incur the net opportunity cost
of lending d  , r∗d  . Thus, if d   is too small, the eventual bailout will not be
suﬃcient in present value to keep foreign lenders in the market.
Does this mean that foreign capital inﬂows are zero if d  is small? The an-
swer is no as long as banks hold deposit liabilities to domestic savers cov-
ered by deposit insurance. Foreign deposits can be serviced in full as a








just equals the foreign deposit liability. Domestic savers are fully covered by
deposit insurance, and the withdrawal of foreign deposits busts the bank.
This type of foreign exit from the banks occurs idiosyncratically across
banks in this model because the only productivity risk is idiosyncratic
across ﬁrms.
A currency crisis occurs when the rate of domestic credit creation neces-
sary to ﬁnance the government’s liability at time T, dT, is exactly consistent
with a collapse of the ﬁxed rate at time T. The timing depends on the sto-
chastic processes for bt and dt (which depend on the entire structure of the
economy), as well as the level of reserves. Thus, if d   is suﬃcient to allow a
currency crisis soon enough that foreign lenders realize their opportunity
rate of return on loans with bailout, then there is a widespread ﬁnancial cri-
sis as all foreign loans are pulled from the banking system. Put diﬀerently,
if the government guarantee is suﬃcient to encourage any foreign capital
inflows, then it leads to an inevitable currency and banking crisis. If d   is
too small to generate an eventual currency crisis, then it also has no impact
on capital inﬂows. The possibility of equilibria in which lending never be-
gins can be ruled out by the condition that
(21) E(min{r,   ~   1})   r∗,
where   ~ – 1 is the net rate of return to bank loan portfolios inclusive of the
returns from rollovers.
We could delink this crisis from the exchange rate peg by changing the as-
sumptions about government guarantees. If there can be a bailout of the
banks in the event of a systemic banking crisis that insures foreign creditors,
then a banking crisis can occur under a ﬂoating exchange rate regime. If the
subsequent liabilities of the government are monetized, the rate of exchange
rate depreciation naturally rises. If the bailout is ﬁnanced by taxes on do-
mestic residents, then consumption growth is depressed (because the timing
is stochastic, Ricardian consumers will not fully smooth consumption
against the tax increase).
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At the moment of the ﬁnancial crisis, there is a sudden reversal of capital
inﬂows as foreign lending stops and households reduce their demand for
domestic currency deposits. The contraction in domestic deposits causes a
contraction in the capital stock given by
(22) kt 1   kt    t 1    t  [(  1)kt   r t t    t]
for a solvent ﬁrm where  t 1–  t 0. This increases the ratio of self-ﬁnancing
to capital sharply,
(23) zt 1   ,
implying that new bank lending will be forthcoming if the banks can bor-
row. Insolvent ﬁrms may also be able to borrow if their debt is restructured
with write-downs that leave them at least solvent. However, with the guar-
antees of the government exhausted, new foreign deposits to the banks are
not supported. Domestic household income and consumption drop along
with the capital stock. If the banks remain in business for intermediating
loans, then domestic saving deposits will ﬂow to domestic ﬁrms, allowing
growth from the new low aggregate capital stock. These deposits are
smaller, in proportion with domestic income, and are only made if there is
deposit insurance as before. As noted, foreign inﬂows will be lower than be-
fore the crisis, so that the growth rate of the economy is also lower than be-
fore the crisis.
If the government does not restructure the domestic ﬁnancial sector, the
growth rate of output could fall even more after the crisis because the in-
termediation beneﬁts of banks are lost, as argued by Calvo (1998a). The loss
of domestic banking would force the use of alternative, higher cost, means
of intermediation.
11.2.6 Empirical Implications
In the model economy, domestic ﬁnancial and currency crises occur si-
multaneously and are inevitable under the policies assumed. These include
the absence of eﬀective prudential regulation of the banks. The foreign in-
debtedness of the banking sector rises in proportion to gross domestic out-
put and the capital stock before the ﬁnancial crisis. The production and
banking model also implies a rise in the growth rate of the capital stock as
the crisis becomes more likely. This will coincide with an increase in the ag-
gregate riskiness of the banking sector’s loan portfolio.
The model also has implications for the market value of ﬁrm and bank
equities. Because loans can be renegotiated, the value of a ﬁrm is not zero
when
[(  1)kt   r t t    t]
   
kt 1
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The ﬁrm is an ongoing enterprise that could potentially pay oﬀits debts, al-
lowing the entrepreneur to accumulate capital in the ﬁrm once more. There-
fore, the stock market value of the ﬁrm includes the option value of “re-
demption” and will remain positive.
The equity value of the ﬁrm is given by the expected present value of the
dividends that it can pay subject to the imposition of the transversality con-
dition. For ﬁrms that have positive net income, the capital stock is rising,
and so is ﬁrm equity. This increase is larger than the rise in productivity for
a positive shock. This can be seen simply by ignoring dividends and calcu-
lating the discounted expected equity of the entrepreneur’s ownership (how
the stock market value of a ﬁrm that does not pay a dividend changes). This
evolves according to
xt 1   (  Rt)kt   Rtxt,
which equals
(24) xt 1   (  Rt)  
1
z
     xt
with lending in the agency model. The present value of the owner’s equity is
given by



















  xt   xt.
Diﬀerentiating with respect to  shows that the equity value of the ﬁrm rises
more than proportionately with the discounted productivity of capital. For
ﬁrms that remain solvent but realize negative net incomes, (  – 1)kt – r t t  
0, the value of equity falls along with the capital stock.
The average value of all producers’ equity evolves over time as capital ac-
cumulates and some ﬁrms renegotiate bank loans. Beginning with all ﬁrms
coﬁnancing investment, the total stock market value of ﬁrms rises as the
average capital stock rises. It also rises to the extent that the equity value
of ﬁrms that have low outputs and downsize (but remain solvent) reﬂects
an increase in the likelihood that they will become insolvent in the future
and renegotiate their loans. For such ﬁrms, the option value of redemption
rises. Once ﬁrms do become insolvent and renegotiate their bank debts, the
value of these ﬁrms remains nonnegative, while the average equity value of
ﬁrms that have been successful continues to rise with the capital stock. Ig-
noring the expectation that there will be a collapse in the capital stock at
date T, the total stock market value of producers would be rising over time
(in the case of large numbers with uncorrelated ﬁrm-speciﬁc shocks) under
foreign capital inﬂows as long as the net expected return to capital exceeds
the rate of interest. However, these dynamics imply a rise followed by a de-
526 Robert Dekle and Kenneth Kletzercline in the total value of ﬁrm equity prior to crisis under rational expecta-
tions.
The equity value of banks also evolves dynamically as loan rollovers take
place. However, banks face an upper bound on the share of the returns to
successful projects they can claim in proportion to the ﬁrms’ capital stocks
in the face of competition from other banks. The banks are accumulating
losses over time, and their equity value must decline in expectation once one
bank has had to roll over the loan of a ﬁrm that cannot repay its short-term
debt. Clearly, the average equity value of banks is lower when some client
ﬁrm has to renegotiate. In the model set up here, the probability of more
renegotiations and of increasing liability for the deposit insurer means that










Therefore, the model of an evolving banking crisis driven by loan
rollovers fueled by foreign capital inﬂows implies that the ratio of the equity
value of banks to the equity value of corporations should be declining in
trend before the crisis. Foreign capital inﬂows should be rising in propor-
tion to gross domestic product if the assumptions of constant returns to
capital and unchanging investment opportunities hold. Output should col-
lapse sharply after the crisis.
The Bernanke and Gertler model of ﬁnancial fragility shows how aggre-
gate productivity cycles are exacerbated through the ﬁnancial accelerator.
This implies that the capital stock falls but that the growth rate could re-
cover in a simple closed-economy Ak model. In our model, foreign capital
inﬂows would need to return to avoid a reduction in the growth rate of the
postcrisis economy.
11.3 The Assumptions of the Theoretical Model and 
the Precrisis Financial Systems of East Asia
The theoretical model generates endogenous accumulations of foreign
debt by a domestic banking sector that is progressively less stable, leading
to an eventual crisis. Three of the model’s assumptions are crucial in this
process. First is the predominance of corporate borrowing from domestic
banks, arising from the informational advantage of banks over other
lenders. Second is the prospect of government deposit insurance, or gov-
ernment bailouts of the domestic banking sector, and government guaran-
tees of foreign loans to the domestic banking sector. Third is supervisory
forbearance and the absence of eﬀective prudential regulation of the bank-
ing sector. In this section, we brieﬂy examine the precrisis ﬁnancial systems
of Korea, Taiwan, Thailand, Malaysia, and Singapore in relation to these
Domestic Bank Regulation and Financial Crises 527assumptions. Table 11.1brieﬂy summarizes this section’s ﬁndings. The econ-
omies with ﬁnancial systems that ﬁt the model’s assumptions most closely
are assigned the highest negative ratings. We ﬁnd that the model’s assump-
tions characterize the ﬁnancial systems of Korea and Thailand very well
(negative ratings: 9) and the ﬁnancial system of Malaysia reasonably well
(negative ratings: 6). The model’s assumptions fail to ﬁt the ﬁnancial sys-
tems of Taiwan and Singapore (negative ratings: 5).
11.3.1 Corporate Reliance on Domestic Bank Borrowing
With regard to the predominance of bank lending, only Korean ﬁrms
were highly reliant on domestic bank borrowing. In Thailand, domestic
banks were not always the dominant lender, because corporations bor-
rowed directly from foreign banks in the oﬀshore market. In Thailand, how-
ever, the importance of ﬁnance companies increased in the 1990s, as licens-
ing requirements were eased. Malaysian, Taiwanese, and Singaporean
ﬁrms were not as reliant on domestic banks, because they actively tapped
bond and equity markets.
Just prior to the crisis, the reliance of Korean corporations on domes-
tic commercial and merchant bank financing was large and increasing.
In 1997, borrowing from banks accounted for close to 50 percent of total
corporate ﬁnancing; this was up from about 35 percent in the mid-1990s
(Pomerleano 1998). Moreover, most of the remaining corporate ﬁnanc-
ing—corporate bonds, commercial paper, and foreign borrowing—was ex-
plicitly guaranteed by banks. For example, in 1996, 87 percent of the bonds
issued by corporations had bank guarantees. The default risk on these
bonds was borne by the banks, because if the corporation failed, the bond-
holder would have recourse to the guaranteeing bank (Dekle and Ubide
1998). Equity ﬁnancing was small; in early 1997, equity ﬁnancing ac-
counted for only 7 percent of total corporate ﬁnancing, down from about
20 percent in the early 1990s. Thus, by early 1997, the debt-equity ratio of
manufacturing corporations was over 300 percent, and most of this debt
was explicitly or implicitly owed to domestic banks (Pomerleano 1998).
Compared to Korea, the reliance of Taiwanese corporations on domes-
tic bank ﬁnancing was markedly lower. In 1996, borrowing from banks ac-
counted for less than 22 percent of total corporate ﬁnancing, down from
about 50 percent in the early 1990s (Chu 1999). By the late 1980s, large cor-
porations could raise most of their funds from the equity market (Chu
1999). Moreover, Taiwan developed a successful venture capital industry
and industry and initial public oﬀering market. In 1997, small and medium-
sized ﬁrms raised $2 billion and $27 billion from venture capital and initial
public oﬀerings respectively. Thus, by early 1997, the debt-equity ratio of
corporations was down to about 85 percent, lower than even the debt-
equity ratios in many industrialized countries.
The reliance of Thai corporations on bank and finance company


















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































5financing was among the highest of the crisis-inﬂicted Asian countries, al-
though some of this reliance was to foreign banks. Between 1992 and 1996,
borrowing from banks and ﬁnance companies accounted for 74 percent of
total corporate ﬁnancing (Pomerleano 1998), and the average debt-equity
ratio was about 180 percent (Pomerleano and Zhang 1999). In 1995 and
1996, borrowing from ﬁnance companies accounted for about 27 percent of
this corporate borrowing. Finance companies tended to focus more on con-
sumer and real estate ﬁnancing, whereas banks loaned more to the manu-
facturing sector. A signiﬁcant fraction of this corporate borrowing was
from foreign, particularly Japanese, banks. Most of the borrowing from for-
eign banks was through the Bangkok International Banking Facility
(BIBF), whose “out-in” lending is entirely foreign currency–denominated.
In 1996, BIBF borrowing accounted for about 18 percent of all bank bor-
rowing by Thai corporations (IMF 2000b).
Between 1992 and 1996, Malaysian corporations raised about 40 percent
of their funds from domestic banks, ﬁnance companies, and merchant
banks, all deposit-taking institutions (Pomerleano 1998). This ratio of pri-
vate corporate borrowing may understate the dependence of the Malay-
sian economy on the banking sector. Consumers and nonincorporated
businesses were also large bank borrowers. Finance companies accounted
for about 20 percent of domestic borrowing and loaned mostly to consum-
ers and nonincorporated businesses. Foreign-owned banks accounted
fora bout 15 percent of all domestic borrowing, although the main source
of funds for foreign banks was domestic deposits. Compared to corpora-
tions elsewhere in Asia, Malaysian corporations have relied somewhat more
on bond, and signiﬁcantly more on equity, ﬁnancing; the debt-equity ratio
was relatively low, at under 100 percent (Pomerleano and Zhang 1999).
Between 1992 and 1996, Singapore corporations raised about 40 percent
of their funds from banks (Pomerleano 1998). Only four banks, all of them
domestic, accounted for 80 percent of these loans. The remaining loans
were from smaller banks, foreign banks, and ﬁnance companies. Although
Singapore has a large oﬀshore market, regulations have kept the domestic
currency and foreign currency markets separate. Borrowing from oﬀshore
in domestic currency by domestic corporations was restricted, although
foreign currency borrowing was not. As in Malaysia, Singapore corpora-
tions have tended to rely more on bond and equity ﬁnancing, thus keeping
the debt-equity ratio to under 90 percent.
11.3.2 Government Explicit and Implicit Guarantees 
of Domestic Bank Liabilities
With regard to government guarantees, in Korea, Taiwan, Thailand, and
Malaysia, bank deposits were implicitly guaranteed by the government,
given that no domestic bank was ever allowed to fail and close. Failing
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or merge with another bank. Singapore also did not provide explicit bank
deposit guarantees, but in the absence of domestic bank failures or take-
overs, it is diﬃcult to assess the extent of implicit guarantees to depositors.
Foreign loans to the domestic banking sector were implicitly guaranteed
in each instance. However, such loans were important only for Korea and,
to a lesser extent, Thailand. Banks in Taiwan, Malaysia, and Singapore
borrowed little from abroad.
Prior to the crisis, the Korean deposit insurance system was segmented;
diﬀerent deposit insurance systems covered diﬀerent ﬁnancial institutions.
Moreover, given the relative newness of the various systems (which started
in the mid-1990s) and the low deposit insurance rates, the accumulated de-
posit insurance premiums were negligibly small. Thus, for all practical pur-
poses, Korea did not have an explicit deposit insurance system. However,
depositors probably viewed their deposits as implicitly insured, because the
Korean government had never allowed a bank to fail (Park 1994). Between
1960 and the mid-1980s, the idea of deposit insurance was moot: Banks
were publicly owned, and monetary authorities controlled every aspect of
bank management. Although banks were privatized in the early 1980s and
ﬁnancial markets were deregulated, the government continued to exercise
control over banks by appointing bank management and by the system of
government policy loans (Dekle and Ubide 1998). Policy loans were used by
the government to direct bank lending to preferred sectors, with the provi-
sion that, should the ﬁrms receiving the loans default, the lending bank
would be bailed out. Although policy loans were largely phased out by the
mid-1990s, the historical involvement of the government meant that banks
developed few skills in credit analysis. Lending decisions were still based on
the availability of collateral, normally real estate (45 percent of all loans),
and government moral suasion.
Domestic banks have intermediated virtually all foreign borrowing by
Korean corporations, in won or in foreign currency. Of the loans borrowed
directly from foreign banks, almost all carried guarantees by domestic
banks (Collins and Park 1989). In the mid-1990s, some companies were able
to directly borrow in overseas bond markets, but this borrowing had to be
bank guaranteed. These various types of bank-intermediated foreign loans
were not explicitly government guaranteed, but given that no domestic
bank had failed, the government was in eﬀect implicitly guaranteeing these
loans. In fact, in August 1997, in the midst of the crisis, the authorities made
explicit their commitment by guaranteeing all foreign liabilities of Korean
banks.
As in Korea, for all practical purposes, Taiwan did not have an explicit
deposit insurance system. Participation in the Taiwanese deposit insurance
system was voluntary, and as a result the accumulated insurance premiums
were very small (Yang 1994). However, as in Korea, depositors viewed their
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owned by various branches of the government. Although the banking sys-
tem was partially privatized in the early 1990s, government-owned banks
still accounted for about 60 percent of total bank loans in 1996 (Chen 2000).
Customers of the government-owned banks were mainly public enterprises
and large private manufacturing ﬁrms (Shea 1994). Private banks were nu-
merous, but all were very small. When insolvent, these private banks were
bailed out by the government (Yang 1994). Most of the bank lending (66
percent) was collateralized, with real estate or, more often, with equity.
Of the Taiwanese foreign borrowing, only 5 percent was explicitly guar-
anteed by the government (Haggard 2000, 134). In any event, the total
amount of foreign borrowing remained small (gross foreign debt: 10.6 per-
cent of GDP). Banks intermediated only about half of this foreign borrow-
ing.
Thailand has never had an oﬃcial, explicit deposit insurance system.
However, the Thai government has always bailed out depositors. Insolvent
banks were usually recapitalized and allowed to operate as normal. During
the crisis, six of ﬁfteen commercial banks were taken over by the govern-
ment. In addition, the government issued a blanket guarantee of all bank
deposits. Finance companies were allowed to fail, but the government has
always guaranteed their deposits ex post. During the crisis, ﬁfty-six out of
ninety-one ﬁnance companies failed, but all deposits were guaranteed, al-
though credits held by the directors and management of failed institutions
were not covered (IMF 2000b).
There were two main sources of foreign borrowing by Thai corporations.
First, corporations borrowed in baht from nonresident deposits in Thai
banks. Nonresident bank deposits have historically received the same guar-
antees as resident deposits. Second, corporations borrowed in foreign cur-
rency from Thai and foreign banks through the BIBF. None of this foreign
currency borrowing was explicitly guaranteed by the government. However,
the foreign currency borrowing intermediated through Thai banks (one-
third of total BIBF borrowing) was, like all domestic bank liabilities, im-
plicitly guaranteed, because these domestic banks could not fail. The gov-
ernment did not implicitly guarantee the borrowing through foreign banks,
because most of this borrowing went to joint ventures—for example, in the
case of Thai-Mitsubishi Motors, the responsibility for paying back this bor-
rowing was viewed as belonging to the parent ﬁrm, Mitsubishi Motors of
Japan.
There was no explicit deposit insurance system in Malaysia. However,
Malaysia has never allowed a bank or ﬁnance company to fail, although ﬁ-
nance companies have been merged. Thus, all deposits at domestic ﬁnancial
institutions were implicitly guaranteed, at least for residents. In fact, ex
post, the government has guaranteed even the deposits at foreign banks;
during the crisis, the government issued a blanket guarantee of all deposits.
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never been sizable in Malaysia, given very strict foreign borrowing regula-
tions. The small amount of borrowing that took place was never explicitly
guaranteed. Historically, Malaysia has often imposed controls on portfolio
outﬂows. For example, in 1994, controls on short-term portfolio inﬂows
were imposed, and in 1998, minimum holding periods (twelve months) and
exit levies (30 percent) on the repatriation of bank deposits held by nonres-
idents were imposed (IMF 1999a). In the case of repatriation restrictions,
the subsequent depreciation of the ringgit has meant that nonresidents ex-
perienced capital losses on their ringgit deposits. Thus, for certain types of
foreign borrowing, such as nonresident ringgit deposits, there were no im-
plicit guarantees either.
Singapore never had an oﬃcial, explicit deposit insurance system. How-
ever, as elsewhere in Asia, no domestic bank or ﬁnance company has ever
been allowed to fail, although the government has not always bailed out de-
positors with deposits at failed foreign banks. Thus, it may be the case that
the implicit guarantee of deposits was selective, limited to deposits at do-
mestic ﬁnancial institutions.
Regulations have prevented Singapore corporations from borrowing
oﬀshore in domestic currency. Given Singapore’s ample saving and low in-
terest rates, oﬀshore foreign currency borrowing by corporations remained
very small; this borrowing was not guaranteed, either explicitly or impli-
citly.
11.3.3 Government Prudential Regulations and Enforcement
With regard to weak prudential supervision, in Korea and Thailand pru-
dential regulations were lax and poorly enforced because of fragmented su-
pervisory systems and supervisory forbearance. Supervisory systems were
strict and well enforced in Malaysia, Taiwan, and Singapore.
Lax prudential standards and supervisory forbearance were major deﬁ-
ciencies in the Korean banking system (Dekle and Ubide 1998). Supervi-
sion of ﬁnancial institutions was fragmented; the Bank of Korea super-
vised commercial banks, but the ministry of ﬁnance supervised merchant
banks. Defects in the soundness of banks were not immediately remedied
once detected by the bank supervisors, and changes to prudential regula-
tions were made to allow banks to report proﬁts and capital positions that
were misleading. For example, provisioning requirements for nonperform-
ing loans were relaxed over 1995–96; those for “doubtful” loans were de-
creased to 75 percent from 100 percent. Although there were regulations
on bank loan exposure to large corporate groups, these regulations were
rarely enforced. For example, the Hanbo group, which collapsed in early
1997, had outstanding loans from the Korea First Bank that were ﬁve times
larger than what was considered prudent. Knowledge of such supervisory
forbearance, together with less than fully transparent accounting, meant
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their solvency.
Although on paper Taiwan’s prudential standards were no stronger than
Korea’s, its supervisory authorities exercised much less forbearance (Chu
1999). The Central Bank of China (CBC) was Taiwan’s main supervisory au-
thority, rather than the Ministry of Finance. In contrast to most ﬁnance min-
istries, the CBC was unusually independent from political inﬂuence. The
CBC governor appointed the senior oﬃcers of all government-owned banks
and forced these banks to observe stricter prudential standards than those
mandated by law. For example, most government-owned banks were forced
to maintain capital-asset ratios above 12 percent (greater than the law’s 8
percent), and a liquid asset–reserve ratio of 9.5 percent (above the law’s 7
percent). The CBC also kept government policy loans under tight limits.
Lax prudential standards were major deﬁciencies of the Thai banking
system (Lindgren et al. 2000). The rules for loan classiﬁcation and ac-
counting were too lenient and were often ignored. For example, loans had
to be in a nonaccrual state for twelve months before being classiﬁed as non-
performing. Banks and ﬁnance companies built up large portfolios of ques-
tionable loans that were often simply rolled over, rather than being classi-
ﬁed as nonperforming. There were no limits on loan exposures to speciﬁc
sectors, such as real estate, although there were limits to individual bor-
rowers. Bank supervision was fragmented between the Ministry of Finance
and the Bank of Thailand. The Ministry of Finance was entrusted with the
overall authority for supervision, but the day-to-day responsibility for su-
pervision was delegated to the Bank of Thailand. All decisions by the Bank
of Thailand had to be ratiﬁed by the Ministry of Finance.
Malaysia’s prudential regulations were drawn from British sources and
were, on paper, more stringent than those of other Asian economies (Scott
1999). Moreover, these regulations were strengthened in the late 1980s and
in the mid-1990s. In particular, broad regulatory and intervention powers
were consolidated at Bank Negara Malaysia (Lindgren et al. 2000). There
were strict limits on connected lending and loan exposure limits (30 percent
of a bank’s capital) to corporate groups. A two-tiered regulatory system,
which provided extra privileges to banks that increased their capital, was in-
troduced. As a consequence, capital-asset ratios of deposit-taking institu-
tions approached 10 percent.
Singapore’s prudential regulations were also drawn from foreign sources,
primarily Britain and the United States, and were far more conservative
than elsewhere in Asia. By law, banks were required to maintain capital-
asset ratios above 12 percent. Broad regulatory and intervention powers
were consolidated at the Monetary Authority of Singapore. In addition,
foreign banks were allowed to operate only on the strength of their home
regulations. Comfort letters were required that stated that home oﬃces
would meet liquidity or capital shortfalls of their oﬀshore aﬃliates (IMF
534 Robert Dekle and Kenneth Kletzer2000a). However, bank disclosure was weak; bank assets were recorded on
accounting statements at historical cost rather than at market value, and
contingent liabilities, such as derivatives positions, were not disclosed (IMF
1999b). Nevertheless, these problems with bank disclosure were worse in
other Asian economies and led to the adoption of more rigorous require-
ments in recent years.
11.3.4 Earlier Studies
Recent studies have examined more systematically the relationship be-
tween banking and regulatory structure, and banking crisis. Demirgüç-
Kunt and Detragiache (2000) create an index that represents the extent of
explicit deposit insurance for sixty-one countries. Using cross-section pro-
bit econometric techniques, the authors ﬁnd that countries with explicit de-
posit insurance systems are more likely to incur a crisis in their banking sys-
tems. The authors ﬁnd that proxies for bank regulation such as rule of law,
quality of bureaucracy, and degree of corruption perform an important role
in curbing the negative eﬀect of deposit insurance on bank stability. Finally,
the authors ﬁnd that in more concentrated banking systems, the probabil-
ity of a banking crisis is smaller. This ﬁnding is somewhat surprising, be-
cause in more concentrated systems banks are “too big to fail” and may be
implicitly insured, thus worsening moral hazard.
Rossi (1999) creates a “bank safety net” index for a sample of ﬁfteen
countries. The index captures the presence of explicit deposit insurance, of
lender of last resort facilities, and of a history of bank bailouts. The index
is noteworthy in that it partially captures the implicit insurance assump-
tions of our model. The author ﬁnds that the index is signiﬁcantly positively
correlated with bank fragility.
In a cross-section study of sixty countries, Barth, Caprio, and Levine
(2000) ﬁnd that the probability of a banking crisis is decreased by securities
market development (especially equity market liquidity), the issuance of
primary-market equity as a share of GDP, and the issuance of long-term
bonds (in the primary market) as a share of GDP. This is consistent with the
assumption of our model that higher corporate security ﬁnancing and
lower bank dependence decrease the probability of crisis.
11.4 Empirical Implications of the Model
Our theoretical model implies that banking and currency crises coincide
and inevitably occur in the absence of eﬀective prudential regulation. Be-
fore the crisis, private foreign debt rises as a ratio of gross domestic produc-
tion. Foreign ﬁnancial capital inﬂows will be a constant fraction of trend
output in the case in which consumption growth equals income growth.
Otherwise, the ratio of inﬂows to output can rise or fall in trend. The in-
vestment-output ratio is constant before the crisis. The shadow value of
Domestic Bank Regulation and Financial Crises 535domestic banks should decline before the crisis. This can be measured by
comparing the stock market value of domestic banks to the stock market
value of the domestic sector.
After a ﬁnancial crisis, the model implies that output contracts and that
the growth rate of output is lower in recovery than it was before the crisis.
This is the case because contingent government bailout has been exercised,
so that the resources that previously subsidized foreign capital inﬂows are
no longer available to subsidize new inﬂows at the same level. The currency
crisis should also lead to a contraction in money demand and an increase in
the rate of monetary growth. The latter is consistent with the monetization
of the sudden increase in government liabilities.
The riskiness of the loan portfolio of domestic intermediaries is rising in
this model. An increasing share of bank loans goes to ﬁrms that have real-
ized low capital productivities in the past, whereas a decreasing share goes
to ﬁrms that have realized high productivities of capital. In the endogenous
growth model used, the productivity of capital is an i.i.d. random variable.
If we allow for a small degree of serial correlation in the productivity of in-
puts for individual ﬁrms, then the marginal productivity of capital will be
decreasing in trend.
11.4.1 Empirical Evidence for the Model
The model can be examined along a number of dimensions using indirect
measures of the factors of interest. The model predicts several relationships.
The key relationship is that increases in capital inﬂows are intermediated
through the banking system and result in increases in lending to the private
sector. This is the case to the extent that capital inﬂows to the domestic sec-
tor are not sterilized, resulting in reserve accumulations rather than ﬁnanc-
ing debits on the current account.
The model predicts an increasing ratio of foreign capital inﬂows and do-
mestic lending as a ratio of output prior to crisis. It also implies that do-
mestic investment will become increasingly risky. This may be reflected
by falling capital productivity in the data. Bank portfolios are predicted to
be deteriorating before the crisis, with the banking system carrying a ris-
ing share of nonperforming assets. The market value of total bank equity
shares should be falling absolutely and in ratio to the total value of out-
standing equity in domestic corporations.
The model also makes postcrisis predictions. There should be an imme-
diate contraction in output and investment. The currency crisis in this
model results from the anticipated postcrisis monetization of government
bailouts of lenders. Consistency with this hypothesis requires that we ob-
serve an increase in the rate of domestic credit creation and growth rate of
the monetary base after the crisis.
The predictions should hold most strongly for the two economies that ﬁt
the assumptions of the model most closely—that is, for Korea and Thai-
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dictions should fail for Taiwan and Singapore. In this section, we examine
whether these predictions hold, using pre- and postcrisis data. The data
sources for all charts are described in the appendix.
11.4.2 Precrisis Capital Inﬂows and Domestic Lending
An important implication of the model is that capital inﬂows are mani-
fested in lending by banks and nonbank ﬁnancial intermediaries. We mea-
sure capital inﬂows using the balance-of-payments data reported by the
IMF, and deposit bank lending to the domestic private sector is measured
by domestic credit. Capital inﬂows are net-gross inﬂows minus gross out-
ﬂows. Figure 11.1 depicts the ratios of lending and capital inﬂows to GDP
for Korea, Taiwan, Malaysia, Thailand, and Singapore. In Korea, the cap-
ital inﬂow-GDP ratio began to rise sharply in 1993, while the lending-GDP
started to rise in 1995. In Taiwan, the lending-GDP and the capital inﬂow-
GDP ratios were constant precrisis, whereas the capital inﬂow ratio rose
sharply postcrisis. In Malaysia, the lending-GDP ratio increased moder-
ately from 1990 to 1994 and more strongly from 1994. The growth in the
capital inﬂow ratio was very strong between 1990 and 1993, but the capital
inflow ratio plummeted in 1994, when the government imposed capital
controls; subsequently, strong capital inﬂow growth resumed. In Thailand,
the lending-GDP ratio grew strongly from 1990 to 1997; correspondingly,
the capital inﬂow ratio grew strongly after 1994. In Singapore, although the
lending-GDP ratio grew moderately after 1990, the capital inﬂow ratio de-
clined sharply from 1990 to 1994. Subsequently, the capital inﬂow ratio re-
sumed its growth. As our model predicts, the physical investment-GDP ra-
tios were relatively constant in each case.
As is well known, capital inﬂows can be sterilized by central banks; this
sterilization can break the link between capital inﬂows and lending. We do
not present a detailed discussion of how eﬀectively capital inﬂows were ster-
ilized in the ﬁve cases; accounts are provided by Spiegel (1995) and Moreno
(1996). There is a strong link between capital inﬂows and lending for Korea,
Malaysia and Thailand, especially since 1994, suggesting that these coun-
tries have not been successful in sterilizing capital inﬂows. Figure 11.2 de-
picts the levels of oﬃcial foreign exchange reserves and the ratio of foreign
exchange reserves to short-term (of maturity less than one year) external
debt. Central banks that engage heavily in sterilized intervention should
have high and rising foreign exchange reserves. Reported oﬃcial Korean re-
serves are net of Bank of Korea foreign currency deposits at overseas
branches. As is well known, the Bank of Thailand had outstanding net for-
ward contracts totaling $7 billion in 1997 and $4 billion in 1996; the re-
sources available to the Bank of Thailand for intervention may be over-
stated by the level of oﬃcial reserves. Compared to Taiwan and Singapore,
between 1996 and 1997 Korea, Malaysia, and Thailand all had low and
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of short-term external debt, suggesting that these countries have not been
successful in sterilizing capital inﬂows. Taiwan and especially Singapore
had high and rising foreign exchange reserves.
Thus, the evidence on capital ﬂows and lending is consistent with our
model. Korea and Thailand had the strongest association between capital
ﬂows and lending, whereas capital controls broke the strong association in
Malaysia in 1994.
Riskiness of Domestic Investment and 
Falling Marginal Productivity of Capital
In our model, adverse selection under limited liability in ﬁnancial inter-
mediation implies bank portfolios that become progressively riskier. In the
aggregate, lending and investment are increasingly allocated to ﬁrms that
have experienced low productivities in the past, rather than to ﬁrms that have
had high productivity experiences. If productivity has a small serial correla-
tion, then the productivity of capital for ﬁrms will be decreasing over time.
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Figure 11.1 Bank lending, capital inﬂows, and investment for A, Korea; B, Taiwan;
C, Malaysia; D, Thailand; and E, Singapore
Source: See appendix.
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BBetween 1992 and 1996, the productivity of capital for ﬁrms in Korea, Tai-
wan, and Singapore all declined, with the sharpest decline for ﬁrms in Thai-
land. The productivity of capital for ﬁrms in Malaysia rose slightly. (The
data are all from Pomerleano and Zhang 1999.) For Korean ﬁrms, the aver-
age return on assets (ROA) declined from 4.5 percent in 1992 to 4.2 percent
in 1996, and their average return on investment (ROI) declined from 6.4 per-
cent in 1992 to 5.6 percent in 1996. For Taiwanese ﬁrms, the average ROA








Bdeclined from 7.6 percent in 1992 to 7.3 percent in 1996, but their average
ROI was constant at 8.6 percent between 1992 and 1996. For Thai ﬁrms, the
average ROA sharply declined, from 9.5 percent in 1992 to 6.0 percent in
1996, and the average ROI sharply declined from 11.6 percent to 7.0 percent.
For Singapore ﬁrms, the average ROA declined from 6.7 percent in 1992 to
6.4 percent in 1996, and the average ROI declined from 9.0 percent in 1992
to 8.6 percent in 1996. For Malaysian ﬁrms, the average ROA actually rose
slightly from 15.5 percent in 1992 to 16.1 percent in 1996, and the average
ROI also rose slightly from 11.7 percent in 1992 to 12.1 percent in 1996.
In the case of Korea, the ROA declined only 1 percentage point over the
1990s. However, Korea was unique in that its ROA was uniformly low be-
tween 1992 and 1996. If we compare Korea to Taiwan, we ﬁnd that the gap
in ROA was over 3.0 percent in the 1990s.
Deterioration of Bank Portfolios
The model predicts that in the presence of government guarantees the ra-
tio of lending to GDP will rise and that the quality of bank portfolios will
decline. The trend in the share of nonperforming loans (NPLs) gives a mea-
sure of the quality of bank portfolios. Panel A of ﬁgure 11.3 compares the
share of NPLs for Korean and Taiwanese commercial banks. In the early
1990s, Korean banks had a much higher NPL share than Taiwanese banks,
owing to the Korean government’s rationalization plans for the chemical
and heavy industries in the mid-1980s, in which Korean banks were forced
to assume the losses of their corporate borrowers. Subsequently, as the prob-
lems of the mid-1980s waned, Korea’s NPLs declined and Taiwan’s rose; by
1996, the share of NPLs in Taiwan approached that in Korea. Panel B of ﬁg-
ure 11.3 compares the share of NPLs for Malaysian and Thai deposit-taking
institutions. In the early 1990s, Malaysia’s NPLs were higher than Thai-
land’s. Subsequently, Malaysia’s NPLs declined and Thailand’s rose sharply,
so that by 1996 Thailand’s NPLs were double those of Malaysia.
Given diﬀerences in accounting standards and regulatory deﬁnitions,
however, cross-border comparisons of NPLs must be viewed with great cau-
tion. Even within-country time series patterns may not be very informative,
because in the 1990s many countries changed their NPL classiﬁcation stan-
dards. For example, in the mid-1990s Korean loan classiﬁcation standards
were made more lenient, accounting in part for the decline in NPLs from
the early to the middle 1990s.
An implication of our theoretical model is that the stock market value
of the domestic banks should be declining much more in the crisis cases
before the crisis than in the noncrisis cases. This decline should be evi-
denced by a significant decline in the ratio of the value of domestic bank
equities to the stock market value of the entire domestic sector. This com-
parison allows us to compensate for overall stock market fluctuations and
trends. Panel A of figure 11.4 compares these ratios for Korea and Tai-
wan. In Korea, the ratio sharply declined between 1992 and 1996, while




BFigure 11.4 Ratio of bank stocks to total stock market value for A, Korea and
Taiwan; and B, Malaysia, Thailand, and Singapore
Source: See appendix.
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Bin Taiwan, the ratio increased. Panel B of ﬁgure 11.4 compares these ratios
for Malaysia and Thailand. In Thailand, the ratio sharply declined between
1992 and 1996, whereas in Malaysia the ratio increased. Thus, the com-
parison of the ratios indicates that the values of domestic banks were dete-
riorating in Korea and Thailand, whereas in Taiwan and Malaysia the val-
ues of domestic banks were improving. As with cross-border comparisons
of NPLs, the cross-border comparisons of bank equity values should also
be viewed with caution. Capital markets in many of these economies were
still developing, whereas in Singapore they were much more mature, mak-
ing comparisons across economies somewhat dubious. In addition, stan-
dards of loan classiﬁcation, provisioning, and accounting varied widely, and
it is not clear that market valuations of bank stocks took adequate account
of these diﬀerences.
Postcrisis Increases in Money Supply Growth Rates
Currency crises in our model’s equilibrium arise because the sudden in-
crease in the public-sector budget deﬁcit is monetized in the wake of a ﬁ-
nancial crisis. This should result in sharp postcrisis growth in money supply.
Figure 11.5 depicts the ratio of narrow money to GDP. In Korea, there was
sharp growth in the narrow money–GDP ratio in 1998. In Thailand, the
growth in the ratio of narrow money to GDP was more muted, owing to the
sterilization of government liquidity support to the banks. In Taiwan,
Malaysia, and Singapore, the ratio of narrow money to GDP declined in
1998. The results are similar if we use the ratio of broad money to GDP.
The Decline in Loan Collateral Values and Crisis
Some models, but not ours, follow Kiyotaki and Moore (1997) and em-
phasize the role of credit constraints based on the value of collateral in pre-
cipitating a crisis under aggregate shocks. These models typically have mul-
tiple equilibria, and the decline in loan collateral values, especially real
estate values, plays a key role in shifting the economy from a “good” equi-
librium to a “bad” equilibrium, in which the crisis is self-fulﬁlling. Figure
11.6 plots the trend in real estate values. Only in Thailand have real estate
prices begun to decline before the crisis. In Korea and in Malaysia, real es-
tate values were constant or rising before the crisis; the real estate values in
these two countries fell only after the crisis.8The decline in real estate prices
after the crisis is consistent with any number of models of ﬁnancial crises.
11.5 Conclusions
The case study comparisons support rather well the hypotheses and im-
plied dynamics of the model of intermediation of foreign capital inﬂows by
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8. Aghion, Bacchetta, and Banerjee (1999b) also introduce real estate prices in a crisis model
with credit constraints. In their model, a collapse of the aggregate value of real estate plays an








Bthe domestic banking system under imperfect information. The pattern of
prudential regulation, deposit insurance, foreign currency debt guarantees,
and corporate reliance on bank credit in Korea and Thailand—two coun-
tries that suﬀered crisis most severely—matches the assumptions of the the-
ory well. These institutional features of the economies of Taiwan and Sin-
gapore do not match the maintained hypotheses of the banking model and
did not suﬀer either crisis or display many of the implied dynamics of the
model. We also ﬁnd signiﬁcant diﬀerences in the time series for the ratios of
nonperforming loans in bank portfolios and the relative stock market value
of the banking sector between Korea and Thailand on the one side and Tai-
wan and Singapore on the other that are consistent with the theory.
The dynamic relationship between foreign capital inﬂows and bank lend-
ing from the model corresponds roughly to the diﬀerences across the crisis
and noncrisis economies. The comparisons of the rate of return to assets for
the cases studied do not clearly ﬁt the model. However, the production side
of the model economy is very simple and does not allow endogenous or ex-
ogenous changes in the technologies available to investors over time. It also
does not determine how the average rate of return to capital changes with
choices of investment projects; this is ambiguous in the absence of speciﬁc
parameterization.
The empirical picture for Malaysia falls between that for Taiwan and Sin-
gapore and that for Korea and Thailand. The relationship between foreign
capital inﬂows and bank lending ﬁts Malaysia except under the imposition
of capital controls; this supports the model’s implications. The ratio of non-
performing loans rises, perhaps as the result of directed lending, whereas
the value of bank shares rises in proportion to the market in the case of
Malaysia. With respect to the institutional hypotheses, Malaysia is also an
intermediate case. We might argue that this result is consistent with our hy-
potheses, although it may also support the alternative hypothesis that
Malaysia suﬀered a loss of investor conﬁdence, which led by association to
a liquidity crisis.
Appendix
Data Sources for Figures
Figure 11.1
Bank lending: All countries except for Taiwan, “Claims on Private Sec-
tor by Private Money Banks” (from IMF International Financial Statistics).
For Taiwan, “Claims on Private Sector by Private Money Banks” (from
Central Bank of China web page). Capital inﬂows: All countries except for
Taiwan, “Financial Account of Balance of Payments” (from IMF Interna-
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Payments” (from Central Bank of China web page). Investment: All coun-
tries except for Taiwan, “Investment in the National Accounts” (from IMF
International Financial Statistics). For Taiwan, “Investment in the National
Accounts” (from Central Bank of China web page). GDP: All countries ex-
cept for Taiwan, “GDP in the National Accounts” (from IMF International
Financial Statistics). For Taiwan, “GDP in the National Accounts” (from
Central Bank of China web page).
Figure 11.2
Reserves: All countries except for Taiwan, “Reserves” (from IMF Inter-
national Financial Statistics). For Taiwan, “Reserves” (from Central Bank
of China web page).
Short-term debt: All countries and provinces (from country central bank
web pages).
Figure 11.3
Non-performing loan ratios of the banking sector: For Korea, “NPLs of
Deposit Money Banks” (from Bank of Korea web page). For Taiwan,
“NPLs of Deposit Money Banks” (from Central Bank of China, personal
correspondence). For Thailand, “NPLs of Financial Institutions, Including
Finance Companies” (from Bank of Thailand web page). For Malaysia,
“NPLs of Financial Institutions, Including Finance Companies” (from
Bank Negara Malaysia, personal correspondence). For Singapore, “NPLs
of Financial Institutions” (from Monetary Authority of Singapore web
page).
Figure 11.4
Stock market values of domestic banks and stock market values of entire
domestic sector: For all countries and provinces (from Bloomburg Finan-
cial Services).
Figure 11.5
Money supplies: All countries except for Taiwan, “Narrow Money”
(from IMF International Financial Statistics). For Taiwan, “Narrow
Money” (from Central Bank of China web page).
Figure 11.6
Real estate values: For Korea (from Social Indicators of Korea). For Tai-
wan (from Government of Taiwan, private correspondence). For Thailand,
Malaysia, and Singapore (from Bloomberg Financial Services).
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Comment Paolo Pesenti
In contrast to many other branches of international economics, the literature
on currency attacks and ﬁnancial meltdown cannot quite rely, at least not for
the time being, on a “neoclassical” theoretical core—that is, on a widely ac-
cepted, formally elegant paradigm linking pervasive normative implications
to rigorous behavioral microfoundations. However, in the absence of a neo-
classical synthesis, the model of currency and ﬁnancial crises that is rapidly
emerging as the focal point in the recent body of research on causes and
implications of market turbulence can be appropriately labeled “neo-
Alexandrian,” or, better, “neo-Alejandrian.” The “Alejandro” here is, of
course, Carlos Diaz-Alejandro, author of, among many other things, the
classic article “Good-Bye Financial Repression, Hello Financial Crash.”
That article may well represent the mother of all papers on twin crises, judg-
ing from the number of “third-generation” models that continue to build di-
rectly or indirectly on its insights ﬁfteen years (and counting) since its publi-
cation. The chapter by Dekle and Kletzer in this volume is a highly enjoyable
contribution to such “neo-Alejandrian” paradigm, and a very ﬁne one.
Substantially, the “neo-Alejandrian” paradigm relies on three building
blocks. The ﬁrst is the overborrowing/overlending/overinvestment syn-
drome—that is, the role of lending booms in the buildup of a ﬁnancial tur-
moil. The idea is that, to the extent that domestic and foreign creditors are
willing to lend against future bailout revenue, unproﬁtable projects, exces-
sively risky investments, and cash shortfalls continue to be reﬁnanced and
rolled over. In the case of foreign borrowing and evergreening, this trans-
lates into an unsustainable path of current account deﬁcits.
Underlying the previous syndrome is the second key ingredient of the
“neo-Alejandrian” construction, namely public guarantees (explicit, im-
plicit, or simply presumed) and expected bailouts. Agents act under the pre-
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which the author is aﬃliated.sumption that corporate and ﬁnancial investment is guaranteed, so that the
return on assets is implicitly insured against bad shocks. To quote Diaz-
Alejandro directly, “whether or not depositors are explicitly insured, the
public expects governments to intervene to save most depositors from
losses when ﬁnancial intermediaries run into trouble. Warnings that inter-
vention will not be forthcoming appear to be simply not believable” (Diaz-
Alejandro 1985, 13). In other words, a time consistency problem is at work
here, as the government cannot commit credibly to a laissez-faire stance.
The third element is contingent liabilities. Public deﬁcits may not be high
before a crisis, but when the government steps in and guarantees the stock
of private liabilities, it must undertake the appropriate ﬁscal reforms. If
these involve recourse to seigniorage revenue and money creation, expecta-
tions of inﬂationary ﬁnancing may lead to speculation in the currency mar-
ket. If the central bank intervenes to stabilize the domestic currency, it loses
reserves that could otherwise be used to bail out insolvent private institu-
tions, and vice versa. Thus results the parallel phenomenon of currency and
banking crises.
Many authors, several of whom are represented in this volume or quoted
in the Dekle and Kletzer chapter, have contributed to the elaboration and
reﬁnement of the “neo-Alejandrian” framework for policy analysis and
evaluation, especially in relation to the Asian crisis. Of course, recent inter-
pretations of crisis episodes have highlighted the role of several factors,
ranging from self-validating panics to magniﬁcation eﬀects related to “ﬁ-
nancial accelerator” mechanisms and liquidity constraints, to institutional
characteristics, to the strategies of large players and highly leveraged insti-
tutions, and so on. Still, it remains true that the building blocks of the “neo-
Alejandrian” approach are recurrent themes in the vast majority of recent
contributions and analyses of turmoil episodes, perhaps providing the min-
imum common denominator that underlies the formation of a consensus
view of emerging-market crises.
With this in mind, what is new in the chapter by Dekle and Kletzer?
Arguably, the value of the paper is the abundance of detail rather than the
originality of vision. Thanks to a clever modeling strategy in which only
idiosyncratic shocks matter, the role of macroeconomic shocks is de-
emphasized, and corporate governance, institutional characteristics, and
prudential regulations and enforcement are brought center stage, the au-
thors are able to articulate a set of close comparisons between theoretical
assumptions and predictions and the empirical evidence for the Asian
countries. For most scholars and analysts, this exemplary overview will rep-
resent the most appealing aspect of the chapter.
On the theoretical side, especially convincing is the way the authors model
the links between ﬁnancial intermediaries and the corporate sector, provid-
ing the foundations for an analysis of twin crises whose occurrence can be
foretold (and therefore prevented). Brieﬂy, the authors set up their analysis
Domestic Bank Regulation and Financial Crises 553by focusing on households (and ﬁrm owners) whose only form of ﬁnancial
diversiﬁcation is through bank deposits. Banks are able to monitor ﬁrms’
performance and diversify risk by lending to many ﬁrms. A ﬁrm ﬁnances
capital with bank loans. Proﬁtability is stochastic. When things go badly, the
entire capital of the ﬁrm goes to the bank. The bank can declare the ﬁrm
bankrupt, but this would not be the best course of action. Rather, the bank
that now has monopoly power can renegotiate the loan, at a premium.
If the bank rolls over the existing loan, the ﬁrm has an incentive to under-
take riskier projects (it has no capital, has limited liability, and pays an inter-
est premium). Ultimately, the bank’s portfolio becomes riskier over time, rais-
ing the contingent liabilities of the deposit insurer. If banks can borrow from
foreign intermediaries and there are limited government guarantees on their
foreign exposure (including schemes of ﬁxed exchange rate) but prudential
regulation is not in place, the rollover/evergreening game can continue until
the government reaches its limit on the indemnity liability. The rest of the
story is well known: A twin currency and banking crisis occurs when foreign
loans are pulled from the banking system, forcing the government to step in
and ﬁnance its bailouts through taxes, inﬂation, and depreciation.
One aspect of the model that may warrant deeper investigation in the
future is the welfare analysis of a twin crisis and its determinants. Indeed,
similar remarks may apply to virtually the entire spectrum of “third-
generation” theories, which are much more focused on the dynamics and
the mechanism of a crisis than on its costs and beneﬁts. We understand
quite well what guarantees do and what role they play in the buildup of an
unsustainable lending boom. What we still do not quite understand is why
guarantees, implicit or explicit, are extended in the ﬁrst place (even when
there is a good story to explain their presence, the literature has been ag-
nostic on why they work in some cases but not in others). It remains rather
unclear why exchange rates are pegged in this type of model, given that no-
body gains anything by limiting exchange rate ﬂexibility. The typical answer
is that ﬁxed rates are a form of implicit guarantee, but this does not solve
the problem. It simply reintroduces the previous question of why there are
guarantees in the ﬁrst place. The authors are well aware of the limits of their
interpretive framework and openly admit they are “interested in the conse-
quences of a ﬁxed exchange rate regime with an explicit or implicit govern-
ment guarantee of the foreign liabilities of the banking sector in the event
of a switch to a ﬂoat, and not the welfare economics of this policy.” It is easy
to predict that, for the next generation of contributions to the “neo-
Alejandrian” paradigm, the latter will be a natural starting point.
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Sebastian Edwards made two comments. First, he said that it was appropri-
ate to bring to the discussion Carlos Diaz-Alejandro’s work “Goodbye Fi-
nancial Repression, Hello Financial Crash,” published in the Journal of De-
velopment Economics in 1985. That paper was a reﬂection of the Southern
corn debt crises of 1982, but it had been completely ignored until now ex-
cept for one follow-up by a graduate student at Columbia University, An-
drés Velasco. Velasco did the mathematics of the Diaz-Alejandro paper and
also published in the Journal of Development Economics, and his work was
also ignored. Edwards also said that a similar narrative on the Southern
corn crises appeared in the special issue of the Economic Development and
Culture Change in 1985 following a meeting on the crisis. It discussed the
devastation of the crises in Latin American countries. Those crises, espe-
cially the Chilean crisis, were really the ﬁrst crises of the twenty-ﬁrst cen-
tury, because there were no ﬁscal deﬁcits or speculative crises in the Krug-
man style, but the banking system was involved and devastated, and there
were government guarantees. Edwards concluded by emphasizing our re-
markable ability to ignore and repeat history. He said that it is important to
emphasize this point in this crisis prevention conference and remind every-
one that we bear the responsibility of preventing newly discovered things—
which may not even be mistaken for new if one looks at history carefully—
from being ignored again.
Second, Edwards pointed out that a similar exercise of counting how
many “negative” marks countries get as a way to predict crises was per-
formed by Goldman and Sachs before the Asian crises. Goldman and
Sachs computed the so-called Short-Term Indicator of Monetary Pressure
(STIMP) of twenty-eight emerging markets, in which the maximum num-
ber of negatives a country could receive was eighteen and the cutoﬀnumber
for crises was thirteen. Before the Asian crises, Korea received fourteen
negatives, but in their report Goldman and Sachs predicted no crisis for Ko-
rea. When challenged to provide an explanation for violating the rule,
Goldman and Sachs referred to the capital controls in place in Korea, but
they did not realize that the controls were not of the right type and that they
might not be working.
Jeﬀrey A. Frankelsaid that Michael Dooley’s early work needs to be men-
tioned in the literature review of the third-generation crisis models (models
in which implicit bailout creates moral hazard).
Martin Feldstein commented on the implementation issue. He said that
we all agree with the conclusion that ﬁnancial supervision and prudential
regulation play an important role in enhancing ﬁnancial stability. However,
the question for developing countries is how to carry out these suggestions
without having experts in these ﬁelds. In these developing countries, bank
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tivity channeled through something called “banks” on behalf of the Min-
istry of Finance. For example, Korea has not ﬁgured out what to do next af-
ter nationalizing all the banks, and Thailand, with no tradition in banking,
is still wondering how to make the system work.
Jorge Braga de Macedo suggested making direct comparisons between
countries when discussing the roles of structural reforms. For example, the
eﬀect of ﬁnancial supervision could be seen clearly by comparing Korea
(where there was no enforcement) and Taiwan (where there was enforce-
ment). Braga de Macedo also suggested comparing countries in good times
in addition to crisis periods. Second, Braga de Macedo remarked that there
are also diﬀerences in corporate structure behind diﬀerences in ﬁnancial su-
pervision. For example, he said, the laws are far more protective of small
and medium-sized enterprises in Taiwan than in Korea, where small busi-
ness were discouraged until very recently.
Linda S. Goldberg made the comment that the issue is probably not
whether there should be capital account openness, but whether there
should be ﬁnancial-sector openness. For countries with small ﬁnancial sys-
tems, she said that the debate is whether they should have their own bank-
ing sector and to what degree or give up their own banking supervision en-
tirely (as New Zealand did) and have another country run their systems.
Giancarlo Corsetti commended the paper for solving a model with both
time inconsistency and a macro shock. He suggested that the author em-
phasize that the exogenous timing of crises in the paper is a simpliﬁcation
and could be endogenized with an endogenous credit constraint. (This
problem is discussed by Corsetti and his co-authors in several papers.)
Liliana Rojas-Suarez said that she disagreed with the pessimistic view
about improvements in regulation and supervision in Asia. She said that the
world experience shows that most serious reforms of banking regulation
and supervision have occurred as a response to severe crises. Indeed, one
can say that there are very limited exceptions to the observation that crises
have preceded the implementation of good supervision. The reason is that
crises bring about the necessary political will to undertake reforms. This
was certainly true in Chile, Mexico, Argentina, the United States, the
Nordic countries, and now Asia. In all these cases, crisis resolution implied
not only a signiﬁcant reduction in the number of ﬁnancial institutions but
also the implementation of eﬀective entry and exit rules from the banking
system. She therefore holds an optimistic view of the reform process in
Asia.
Charles W. Calomiris said that there is a large and growing literature re-
lated to the paper. For example, the World Bank has a micro-level data set
in which countries’ regulatory systems are characterized in the same way as
in the paper, simply with more dimensions and better standards for charac-
terization. He said that many papers have used this data set and have found
556 Robert Dekle and Kenneth Kletzerstrong evidence on whether designed features of governmental protection
produced risk-taking and in turn aﬀected macroeconomic stability.
Calomiris also said that there was a literature studying what banking sys-
tems were like prior to the creation of safety nets using micro data, which
found that during the second period of renegotiation there was a contrac-
tion in lending—even in the United States, during its early developing
stage. Calomiris suggested that the authors include these ﬁndings as sup-
portive evidence to their theory.
Another comment by Calomiris concerned the nonperforming loan
data, which, he said, are not uniform across countries and are subject to
ﬂaws. Lastly, Calomiris made the remark that people who had paid atten-
tion to the ﬁnancial sector knew in advance that the Asian crisis was com-
ing.
Simon Johnson suggested including the ownership of banks—in particu-
lar, the linkage between banks and ﬁrms—in the analysis. He said that the
corporate set of issues was not addressed in the paper, and it was worth
thinking about how to incorporate it.
Robert Dekle said that it is endogenous that Taiwan has good supervi-
sion. Taiwan is not a member of an international ﬁnancial institution;
therefore, it has strong incentives to develop a good bank supervisory sys-
tem. For example, its central bank could resist the pressure from the Min-
istry of Finance and politicians to extend loans given their overarching na-
tional security type of protection. Dekle also said that he and Kletzer did
not study the Indonesian case because their model was motivated by the
Korean example.
Kenneth Kletzer appreciated the suggestion that the timing of the crisis
could be endogenized and was treated as exogenous in the model only for
simplicity’s sake.
The authors noted that they were pleased that Sebastian Edwards appre-
ciated that their paper was motivated by Carlos Diaz-Alejandro’s paper,
and in response to Jeﬀrey A. Frankel noted that they did refer to Michael P.
Dooley’s papers on ﬁnancial crises.
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